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After more than a decade of  predominantly neo-liberal industrial relations policy and adversarial industrial relations, 
recent Korean governments have attempted to use social partnership as a mechanism to achieve cooperative and 
peaceful industrial relations and to balance economic efﬁ ciency with social equity in the context of  globalisation. 
This paper has two aims. First it seeks to put the current social partnership experiment in historical perspective and 
argues that current developments in Korean industrial relations remain heavily inﬂ uences by Korea’s experience 
of  rapid economic development and democratic transition. Secondly the paper examines the extent to which the 
Korean experience with social partnership over recent years conﬁ rms views about social partnership developed in 
relation to recent European examples.
Introduction
Until the late 1990s, Korean governments attempted to limit and constrain the power of  the independent 
unions while at the same time gradually increasing labour market ﬂ exibility. These policies were largely 
unsuccessful. The election of  Kim Dae-jung as President, and the pressures for reform associated with 
the IMF bailout, marked a critical juncture in Korean industrial relations. The Roh Moo-hyun government 
has continued the social partnership experiment begun by Kim Dae-jung. This paper has two aims. First 
it seeks to put the current social partnership experiment in historical perspective and argues that current 
developments in Korean industrial relations remain heavily inﬂ uences by Korea’s experience of  rapid 
economic development and democratic transition. Secondly the paper examines the extent to which the 
Korean experience with social partnership over recent years conﬁ rms views about social partnership 
developed in relation to recent European examples. The ﬁ rst section provides a brief  overview of  recent 
debates about social partnership in Europe. The second section of  the paper provides historical overview 
of  developments in Korea industrial relations since the early 1960s. The ﬁ nal section focuses on the fate 
of  the Korean Tripartie Comission, Korea’s recent experiment with social partnership.
Social partnership: Theory and practice 
The concept of  social partnership refers to a process of  negotiation between unions, employers and the 
government which is designed to improve economic performance and at same time ensure social equity. 
Related terms include concertation and neo-corporatism. As Ferner and Hyman (1998: xv-xvi) put it: 
The idea of  social partners implies… ﬁ rst a societal recognition of  the different interest of  workers 
and employers; second an acceptance- indeed encouragement- of  the collective representation of  
these interests; and, third, an aspiration that their organised accommodation may provide an effective 
basis for the regulation of  work and the labour market. 
With the development of  stagﬂ ation in the developed market economies during the 1970s, there were a 
number of  attempts by governments in developed market economies to use social partnerships to control 
inﬂ ation. With a few notable exceptions, including Sweden, these policies proved to be unstable and largely 
ineffective. Analyses of  successful forms of  social partnership during this period stressed two key factors. 
The ﬁ rst was the existence of  central organisations of  employers and, more importantly, unions who could 
take on a representative role and “transcend sectionalism” (Goldthorpe 1984: 325). The focus of  analysis 
thus shifted to establishing the extent to which unions and employer groups were encompassing enough to 
control the demands of  their afﬁ liates and thus provided the structural preconditions for social partnership. 
The second set of  factors associated with successful social partnership during this period related to the 
ability of  the government to offer workers a political tradeoff, or exchange, for wage restraint. 
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For many this implied the existence of  a social democratic government operating within in 
Keynesian economic policy framework prepared to use expansionary ﬁ scal policy to compensate 
workers and employers for wage restraint (see for example Scharpf  1991).
During the 1990s, durable and effective social pacts developed in a number of  European 
countries, most notably in Ireland and Italy. Since the late 1980s, there have been ﬁ ve separate 
social partnership agreements in Ireland between the government, unions, employers and most 
recently, farmers and civil society groups. As Baccaro (2003: 688) notes, social partnership in 
Ireland appears to have played a signiﬁ cant role in turning around the Irish economy during 
this period with real GDP increasing almost four times as fast as other European economies 
during this period. The 1992 signing of  a tripartite anti-inﬂ ationary agreement that banned 
wage indexation marked the beginning of  a new social pact in Italy which negotiated changes 
to collective bargaining, pension reform and the introduction of  new forms of  contingent work 
during the 1990s. While appearing to be less economically successful than the Irish social pact, 
Baccaro argues that social partnership has played an important role in stabilising Italian politics 
(2003: 690).
The preceding discussion has a number of  implications for assessing Korea’s experiment 
with social partnership. First, while Korea lacks the structural preconditions, especially the 
encompassing organisations, which have traditionally been associated with social partnership, 
to the extent it can develop alternative mechanisms for consensus building, especially within 
the union movement, it may be able to sustain a stable social partnership framework. Second, 
social partnership in Korea is likely to be dependent on the extent to which the government 
and unions think that negotiation is necessary for them to adjust to an increasingly restrictive 
economic climate.
A brief  overview of  Korea industrial relations
KOREA INC: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS POST DEMOCRATISATION: Korea’s history 
of  compressed development from the early 1960s has a number of  important implications for its 
contemporary industrial relations and its experiment with social partnership. The main features 
of  Korea’s economic and political development since the 1960s are well known and are only 
brieﬂ y summarised here. Following a military coup led by Park Chung-hee in the early 1960s, 
Korea embarked on a process of  state-led, export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) in two phases- 
labour intensive industrialisation from 1961- 1972 and capital intensive industrialisation from 
1973 on.  Both phases of  EOI were characterised by what Amsden (1989) calls ‘industrialisation 
through learning’, in which Korean companies competed in mature markets and product lines 
on the basis of  economies of  scale and price competitiveness rather than differentiation. Unlike 
some of  the other Asian NICs, who made use of  foreign direct investment, the Korean state’s 
chosen agents for industrialisation were the chaebol; family owned businesses, many of  whom 
were implicated in corruption scandals during the Rhee period. 
The state played two key roles for the chaebol which allowed them to develop rapidly into large, 
diversiﬁ ed but regionally concentrated conglomerates. First, the Korean government borrowed 
heavily in international markets, particularly the US, and channelled this money as working capital 
into the chaebol through low interest loans. The high debt to equity ratios of  the chaebol made 
it easier for the state to direct and control their activities (Woo, 1991). Second, the state took 
steps to control and subordinate labour.  As part of  initial efforts to quash political opposition, 
Park banned strikes, deregistered all existing unions and arrested many union leaders. He also 
established a new trade union confederation, the FKTU, under government control. This was 
followed by sweeping revisions to labour laws in 1962 and 1963, introduced in the 1940s by the 
AMG, which were designed to control and limit union activity. Labour repression as further 
enhanced in 1972 under the “revitalising constitution” with direct police and KCIA intervention 
in labour disputes, a revision of  the labour laws and the introduction of  ﬁ rm level Labour 
Management Councils (LMCs) as the primary grievance settlement body (see Deyo, 1987; Leggett 
and Park 2004). 
The period of  authoritarian control of  labour had a number of  important implications for post-
democratisation industrial relations. First, because Korea’s competitiveness had largely been based 
on the ability to the chaebol, with the assistance of  the state, to control labour costs, the emergence 
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of  a strong independent union movement in key sectors of  the economy was particularly 
signiﬁ cant. The efforts of  these workers to increase wages, reduce working time and improve 
conditions- after more than two decades of  suppression- had a direct impact on competitiveness 
of  the chaebol. Furthermore, because they had been able to rely on state supported labour control, 
Korean labour management was incredibly backward. Korean companies had developed few 
of  the sophisticated labour management techniques associated with worker commitment and 
the ability to compete on quality and differentiation. Thus, because of  the top heavy structure 
of  the Korean economy, industrial relations issues had direct signiﬁ cance for Korean economic 
performance (Wilkinson, 1994). 
By the same token Korea’s experience of  labour suppression had also created a highly fragmented 
labour movement and a highly decentralised bargaining structure. Of  particular signiﬁ cance was 
the relationship between the FKTU and its afﬁ liates and the new independent union movement. In 
many cases the new independent unions formed in opposition to not only company management 
but also government controlled FKTU unions. However, if  the independent union movement 
was to sustain itself  and go beyond workplace bargaining over wages in conditions, it needed 
to develop industry level and peak level representation. As we shall see, the legal status of  
confederations of  independent unions and the willingness of  these confederations to enter into 
ofﬁ cial dialogue on behalf  of  their afﬁ liates is one of  the most important issues in contemporary 
Korean industrial relations.
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN KOREA SINCE 1987: There have been a series of  dramatic changes in 
Korean industrial relations, often convulsive, since democratisation. It is useful to brieﬂ y review 
the phases of  development in order to provide a context in which to analyse current trends and 
likely future directions. One means of  distinguishing between various phases is to divide the period 
from 1987 to 2004 into four phases: democratisation and instability (1987-89); neo-corporatism 
(1990-92); neo-liberalism (1993-97); the social partnership experiment (1997 to the present). 
As has already been noted, the June 29th Democratisation announcement marked an important 
shift in Korean industrial relations. The new Korean government declared the principle of  
autonomous industrial relations including the legal right for employees to unionise and for unions 
to bargain collectively. Yet there remained prohibition on more than one union per enterprise, 
third party intervention in disputes and political activity by unions. These were the provisions 
that had been used to suppress independent unionism during the 1970s and in the early 1990s 
were again used to constrain independent unionism. 
As the ﬁ gures in table 1 illustrate, in the aftermath of  the democratisation announcement there 
was an explosive growth of  unions and widespread strikes for wage increases. Between 1987 
and 1989, the number of  union members doubled and the number of  enterprise unions almost 
tripled. The increased unionisation was highly concentrated in large organisations. By 1989, more 
than two thirds of  workers in ﬁ rms of  500 or more were unionised. This compares with less 
than 10% of  employees in ﬁ rms with less than 300 employees (Lee and Lee, 2004: 146). During 
this period wages increased by an average of  15% per annum, although favourable external 
economic conditions associated with the three lows (low exchange rate, low oil price and low 
interest rates) offset the economic impact of  increased wages (Lee, S. H, 2004). This period also 
saw the development of  regional and industrial confederations of  independent unions which 
were the genesis of  the Korean Confederation of  Trade Unions (KCTU).
The landslide election of  the conservative Democratic Justice Party in 1990, under the leadership 
of  President Rho Tae-Woo, resulted in a reversion to authoritarian repression of  illegal trade 
unions (notably those associated with the KCTU). This involved much greater state intervention 
in ‘illegal’ industrial disputes and the strict enforcement of  third party intervention provisions 
in the labour law. At the same time, in a “divide and rule’ strategy the government sought to 
incorporate the FKTU as the ofﬁ cial trade union centre and a political partner. One of  the 
consequences of  this was an increasing number of  unions shifted their allegiance from the 
FKTU towards industrial confederations associated with the KCTU.
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TABLE 1
Selected 
employment 
relations 
indicators in 
Korea
Note: * With respect to total employees
Source, Leggett and Park (2004) compiled from Korea Labor Institute (various issues), Quarterly 
Labor Trend.
Name
1970
1975
1980
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Unions
Membership 
(‘000)
473
750
948
1004
1036
1267
1707
1932
1887
1803
1735
1667
1659
1615
1599
1484
1402
1481
1527
12.6
15.8
14.7
12.4
12.3
13.8
17.8
18.6
17.2
15.9
15.0
14.2
13.5
12.6
12.2
11.5
11.5
11.8
11.6
Density(%)* Number of  
unions
3500
4091
2635
2551
2675
4103
6164
7883
7698
7656
7527
7147
7025
6606
6424
5733
5560
5637
5898
Number of  
strikes and 
lockouts
4
52
407
265
276
3749
1873
1616
322
234
235
144
121
88
85
78
129
198
250
Industrial disputes Unemployment 
rate (%)
5.2
4.0
3.8
3.1
2.5
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.4
2.8
2.4
2.0
2.0
2.6
6.8
6.3
4.1
1
10
49
29
47
1262
294
409
134
175
105
109
104
50
79
44
146
92
178
As the economic climate deteriorated, the government also issued wage guidelines and attempted 
to constrain wage growth within these guidelines. While the number of  strikes declined and 
unionisation fell from its heights in 1989, the highly decentralised nature of  collective bargaining 
in Korea and the high level of  unionisation in large companies, meant that the government and 
employers were unable to constrain wage growth within the guidelines. In response to declining 
competitiveness, Korean employers also attempted to introduce changes in labour management 
which including the introduction of  performance based reward systems, the increased use of  
irregular workers and multi-tasking. These changes were strongly resisted by independent unions. 
Thus by 1993, while ﬁ rm-level collective bargaining had become the accepted mechanism 
for setting wages and conditions, relations between labour and management remained highly 
antagonistic (Lee, S.H, 2004).
Under the Kim Young-sam government there was a shift from authoritarian control to an 
increasingly neo-liberal policy stance. In the period leading up to the election of  Kim Young 
Sam, the independent unions had called for revisions of  the labour laws to remove the ban of  
political activity by unions, allow for multiple unionism and give public sector employees rights 
to form unions and bargain. Korea’s accession to the ILO in 1991 and its efforts to become 
a member of  the OECD heightened expectations that the reform oriented Kim Young Sam 
government would revise labour laws in line with union demands.  However, employers were 
opposed to these changes and were calling for changes to labour laws which would increase 
levels of  labour market ﬂ exibility. 
In May 1996 a Presidential Commission on Industrial Relations Reform (PCIRR) was set up 
to discuss labour law reform. While it was hoped that that this would create the situation for 
agreement between employers and unions and resolution of  the legal status of  the independent 
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union movement, the PCIRR failed to reach a consensus. Instead, the New Korea Party 
unilaterally introduced labour law revisions to the National Assembly in December 1996, 
which mainly addressed employer concerns but did not resolve the state of  the independent 
union movement 
The pro-employer approach to labour law reform taken by the Kim Young Sam government 
to labour law reform, in part, reﬂ ected a shift in balance of  power between the government 
and the chaebol. While during the authoritarian period the government had been able to use 
access to credit as a means of  controlling the chaebol, ﬁ nancial market liberalisation during the 
1990s, which had been accelerated under Kim Young Sam had allowed many of  the chaebol 
direct access to international ﬁ nancial markets. With access to foreign loans, the chaebol became 
less dependent on the state. While the dramatic growth of  private, largely short term, debt in 
Korea during the 1990s was to have signiﬁ cant implications for the Korean economy during 
the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis (see Shin and Chang 2003 and below), in the mid- 1990s it created 
a situation in which employer opinion was able to dominate the reform agenda. Employer 
interest in issues like the ability to redeploy labour, lay off  workers and engage temporary 
workers reﬂ ected not only the pressures associated with globalisation but also the extent to 
which collective bargaining with strong independent unions had eroded the traditional sources 
of  competitiveness of  Korean ﬁ rms.
The manner in which these reforms were introduced- late at night in the absence of  opposition 
parties in the National Assembly- sparked the biggest general strike in Korean history in January 
and February of  1997. Importantly, protest against the labour laws was jointly coordinated by the 
KCTU and FKTU and indicated a greater degree of  inter-union cooperation than in the past. In 
February 1997 the government was forced to withdraw the labour law amendments and introduce 
a revised labour law which included a timetable for the legalisation of  the KCTU and public 
sector bargaining rights and delayed the introduction of  layoffs for managerial reasons. While 
the 1997 strike demonstrated the continuing signiﬁ cance of  the independent union movement 
in Korea, despite reductions in trade union density during the 1990s, it also illustrated the extent 
to which the limitations of  enterprise bargaining and the need for union movement to engage in 
the political process to ensure its position (Lee and Lee 2004). In particular, many argued without 
engagement, the independent union movement in Korea was likely to be conﬁ ned to the highly 
economistic role of  setting wage and conditions for a small minority of  workers.
A new social partnership? The fate of  the Korean tripartite commission
Ironically, the ﬁ nancial crisis later in 1997 and the IMF bail out gave the government of  President 
Kim Dae-Jung the opportunity to introduce more far-reaching industrial relations reforms than 
those achieved under the previous government and created the conditions for the development 
of  a social pact for the ﬁ rst time in Korean history.
During 1996 there was sharp decline in Korea’s the current account balance to $23.7 billion 
(more than 5% of  GDP) largely reﬂ ecting falling export earnings from semiconductors. While 
not serious by international standards, high levels of  short term debt and declining international 
investor conﬁ dence associated with Thai and Indonesian currency crises and the collapse of  
Hanbo and Kia, produced a major ﬁ nancial crisis. On December 3rd 1997 the Korean government 
announced that it was seeking a loan from the IMF. The IMF bailout package committed the 
Korean government to a series of  major reforms designed to address what the IMF saw were 
long term structural problems in the Korean economy.  These included restructuring of  the 
ﬁ nancial system, corporate governance reforms, the introduction of  tight monetary and ﬁ scal 
policy, privatisation of  state owned corporations and policies designed to expand labour market 
ﬂ exibility. In particular, the IMF sought amendments to labour laws that would make widespread 
redundancies possible (Shin and Chang 2003: 34-41 & 56).
The dramatic deterioration of  the economic situation following the IMF intervention created 
the crisis conditions for the formation of  a social pact. The Korean Tripartite Commission 
was established as a presidential advisory body and included representatives from the 
government, both the KCTU and FKTU, the Federation of  Korean Industries and the Korean 
Employers Federation. 
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In late January it released the “Tripartite Joint Statement on Fair Burden Sharing the Process of  
Overcoming the Economic Crisis” and on February 9th 1998 it released a detailed social pact. 
This pact agreed to the immediate revision for the labour laws to allow layoffs for managerial 
reasons and the use of  agency workers. In return it put in place income security programs for 
the unemployed, recognised the KCTU, reduced restrictions on union political activity and gave 
government employees the right to organise and teachers bargaining rights (from July 1999).
During the negotiations KCTU ofﬁ cials had failed to gain employer acceptance for concession 
bargaining which protected employment by reducing wages and/or working time. Instead the 
agreement accepted the legal right to layoff  workers in return for other concessions.  The social 
pact was rejected by KCTU afﬁ liates by a margin of  2 to 1. The KCTU leadership resigned en 
masse. The newly elected KCTU leadership refused to rejoin the KTC.
Since mid 1998, the KTC has made limited progress. After direct negotiation between the 
government and the KCTU, which committed the KTC to discussing restriction of  the layoff  
system and use of  temporary workers, reductions in working hours and the strict prohibition 
of  unfair labour practices, the KCTU joined the second KTC in June 1998. However, in August 
the government unilaterally announced a plan for restructuring the banking sector and the 
privatisation of  public enterprises. Both raised the prospect of  signiﬁ cant redundancies. The 
KCTU accused the government of  using the KTC to rubber stamp policy decisions that had been 
made elsewhere and eventually withdrew in February 1999. Thus, since the initial breakthrough 
social pact, business and labour representatives have adopted an ‘empty chair’ approach to the 
KTC (Kong 2004: 29).
The Commission has subsequently undergone a series of  attempted renewals, the most recent 
being by President Rho Moo-Hyun. A number of  proposals have been put forward to revive the 
KTC. These include strengthening both the political and technical proﬁ le of  the KTC as a key 
institution for national-level social dialogue and using the KTC as the main policy-making forum 
in labour policy. It has been proposed that the membership of  the KTC should be extended 
to include a broader range of  interest groups and specialists, including the establishment of  
a ‘policy consultation group’ for each industrial sector. It is also argued that the national and 
industry-level activities of  the KTC should be supplemented by more decentralised and ﬁ rm-
level consultative systems. Although Korea has had Labour-Management Councils for a number 
of  years, the experience has been mixed and joint consultation has not been widely utilised. 
Another proposal is to upgrade and strengthen other labour market institutions which could 
complement the work of  the KTC. This includes broadening the role of  the National Labour 
Relations Commission (NLRC) which is underutilised in its role of  providing mediation and 
conciliation to help minimise and settle industrial disputes (Lee 2003).
Despite these proposals, the future of  Korea’s experiment with social partnership remains 
uncertain.  The breakthroughs achieved by the ﬁ rst KTC support some of  the ﬁ ndings of  studies 
of  recent social pacts in Europe. The Asian ﬁ nancial crisis created the sense of  crisis necessary 
for the social partners to enter into a social pact, without the promise of  signiﬁ cant political 
exchange and, even though both the unions and employers lacked encompassing organisations, 
the KTC was able reach agreement on labour law reform. Nevertheless, while these conditions 
made the original social pact possible, a number of  factors have prevented the development of  
ongoing social partnership as has been the case in a number of  European countries. The changes 
in labour law, which made it possible for Korean employers to shed signiﬁ cant amounts of  labour 
during the crisis, and Korea’s rapid economic recovery have reduced the incentive for business 
to sustain its involvement in social partnership. Employers achieved many of  the increases in 
labour market ﬂ exibility they had wanted in the ﬁ rst social pact and industrial restructuring has 
reduced the threat posed by independent unions.
By the same token, the impact of  the original social pact reduced both the willingness and the 
ability of  organised labour to remain engaged in social partnership.  As Kong (2004: 34) puts it 
“the beneﬁ ts of  some future political inclusion … were not very tangible in comparison with 
the loss of  members and inﬂ uence caused by economic restructuring”. Kong suggests that 
because of  the relatively new and underdeveloped nature of  social welfare protection in Korea, 
in comparison with European countries which have been able to form social pacts in the 1990s, 
the impact of  industrial restructuring fell more heavily on rank and ﬁ le union members.  The 
failure of  the KTC to entertain trading off  wages for job security, and the widespread use of  
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layoffs by Korean employers in the aftermath of  the crisis, effectively made it impossible for 
Korean union leaders to convince afﬁ liates and rank and ﬁ le union members of  the beneﬁ ts 
of  social partnership. This was exacerbated by the legacy of  highly decentralised bargaining in 
Korea which concentrated most of  the decision making authority in the Korean union movement 
in enterprise level unions. Thus, unlike Ireland and Italy, Korean union leaders were not able 
to develop a functional equivalent to the encompassingness necessary for a stable social pact. 
In effect, the actions of  employers and the government in the ﬁ rst social pact undermined the 
likelihood of  ongoing social partnership. In response to these developments, the KCTU, and to 
a lesser extent to FKTU, have returned to an oppositional stance, with a focus on developing 
industry wide bargaining to overcome the problems of  decentralised bargaining (Lee and Lee 
2004).  Despite the efforts of  the government to revive social partnership, these developments 
suggest that a revival of  social partnership in Korea is highly unlikely.
It has been argued that while environmental factors provided favourable conditions for the 
successful initiation of  the KTC, structural and attitudinal factors have hampered its effectiveness 
of  its operation in the longer term. This argument emphasises the catalytic effect of  the 1997-
98 ﬁ nancial crisis in bringing the various parties together and producing the ‘great compromise’ 
of  February 1998. However, once the crisis passed, the parties returned to their tradition of  
adversarial labour relations- attitudes shaped by Korea’s pattern of  economic development and 
developments since democratisation. The lack of  centralised union and employer organisations 
as well as the absence of  a Social Democratic or Labour party meant that there was an absence 
of  institutional structures to maintain support of  the KTC. Finally, the absence of  a social 
partnership ideology and mutual trust was detrimental to the development of  positive attitudes 
to the KTC. While Baccaro (2003) and others have suggested that some of  the new social 
pacts in Europe have persisted and achieved success despite the lack of  traditional supportive 
mechanisms, the comparison of  these European examples with the Korean case suggests that 
that the ongoing success of  social partnership is in part determined by the ability to develop 
effective and stable institutional arrangements within which social partnership can take place. 
The Korean case is different from the models of  democratic corporatism that have emerged 
in some European countries and it remains a dynamic and developing political economy in 
which new labour market institutions are still evolving. The ongoing challenge for the Korean 
government is to persuade the unions and the employers that social partnership offers a better 
alternative than a return to strong central controls over a laissez-faire approach which gives free 
rein to the market. Just as earlier experiences of  Korea has provided an example of  how ‘neo-
liberalism mutates when transplanted to different local environments’ (Kong, 2004: 39), the 
current experiment with social partnership may yet reveal that Korea will forge a new model of  
democratic corporatism fostered by strong government initiative and commitment to building 
new labour market institutions.
Conclusion
Since 1987 Korea has experienced dramatic changes in industrial relations and industrial relations 
issues are likely to remain central to economic reform into the future. In contrast to developments 
in many developed countries during the same period, Korea has witnessed the development of  
a strong and militant independent union movement that has been able to improve the wages 
and conditions of  workers, especially in the core manufacturing sector of  the economy and an 
improvement in labour rights. Collective bargaining has become institutionalised for a signiﬁ cant 
percentage of  Korean workers. However, the highly decentralised and antagonistic character of  
collective bargaining in Korea, which largely reﬂ ects Korea’s history of  compressed development, 
will remain a signiﬁ cant impediment to the development of  stable and peaceful industrial relations 
in Korea. While the Asian ﬁ nancial crisis created the conditions for the development of  a social 
pact for the ﬁ rst time in Korean history, despite the absence of  the structural preconditions 
deemed necessary, the prospects for a revival and continuation of  social partnership are 
unfavourable.  This suggests that, without the development of  a stable institutional framework, 
the highly antagonistic pattern of  industrial relations that has developed in Korea during the 
1980s is likely to continue.
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